The History of the 168th Infantry Regiment
(From October 1, 1944 to October 31, 1944)
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The History of the 168th Infantry Regiment
(From October 1, 1944 to October 31, 1944)
Text which has
been significantly corrected in, or added to, this document is enclosed
in [square brackets].
This narrative
for this period, especially 29 through 31 October 1944, is often a
threading together of individual battalion and company reports;
therefore you may see frequent repetition of content.
[ 1 October 1944
]
At the beginning of this
period the Regiment was attacking to the
north with the mission of gaining control of the Sambro River valley.
The enemy, having fought minor delaying actions at the Gambellata River
on 26 September and at la Calcinara (775114) the night of 27 September,
had disengaged his rear guard elements in the heavy rain of 28 September
and had passed them through a prepared line which he was holding in
strength approximately along the 18 Northing. The Regiment, attacking on
a sixty-five-hundred meter front on 30 September, had failed to breach
this line. The 2nd Battalion, with the mission of capturing Mt. del
Galletto, had attacked with two companies abreast and, after both
assault companies had been stopped by small-arms and mortar fire, had
organized an all-around defense on the southern slopes of the mountain,
with its most advanced platoon position at the 18.4 Northing. The 1st
Battalion had initiated an attack along the ridge which commands the
Sambro valley on the west with the objective of taking Hill 747
(771202), by the capture of which the Battalion would gain control of
the lateral road to the Setta River valley which encircles the hill on
the north. In this attack, elements of Company "B" had made
two attempts to reduce an enemy strong point in a house at point 664
(776155) without success. The Battalion had then consolidated its
position for the night with Company "A" on Hill 864 (778152),
Company "B" in a position which extended from a point on the
ridge just to the north of Hill 864 down to the road, where it had
established a road block, and Company "C" on Hill 750
(786152). In the plan of attack for 1 October, the Regimental sector was
reduced from the sixty-five-hundred meter front of the previous day to a
three-thousand meter front by the relief of the 2nd Battalion. This
relief would be affected at 0600 hours 1 October, when the 133rd
Infantry Regiment was to pass through the 2nd Battalion in an attack on
Mt. del Galletto. The mission of the 1st Battalion was unchanged.
Supported by the 2nd Platoon, Company "B", 757th Tank
Battalion and the 3rd Battalion, which was assembled in the vicinity of
Qualto (794161), the Battalion would resume the attack at 0600 hours
with Hill 747 as its objective. After this hill had been taken by the
1st Battalion, the 3rd Battalion, leaving one company at Qualto to
secure the high ground, was to advance astride the Sambro valley road
and occupy S. Benedetto. The 2nd Battalion, initially in reserve, was to
pass through the 1st Battalion on the morning of 2 October.
On 1 October the 1st
Battalion attacked in a column of companies in
the order Company "A", Company "C", and Company
"B". Company "A" jumped off in the attack from Hill
864 at 0640 hours and reported at 0915 hours that it was digging in on
Hill 785 (777163). Upon receipt of this information, Lt. Col. John E.
Golding, Battalion Commander, started Company "C" for Hill 726
(778159) and requested that the 3rd Battalion move forward to exert
pressure on the right. Company "C" reached Hill 726 at
approximately 1000 hours and sent a platoon to Hill 785 to support
Company "A".
Two-hundred yards to the
northwest of Company "A"'s
position on the wooded crest of Hill 785 was Hill 789, from which the
Battalion had received fire on the previous day. In a commanding
position on the crest of the hill stood a church [Oratorio M. Armato],
which the enemy had chosen to organize as a strong point from which to
contest our advance up the ridge. The only covered approach to the
church was through the scrub pine on the northwestern slope of the hill.
On the south open fields sloped down on each side of a lane, which
followed along the top of the ridge from Hill 785 to the church. The
field to the east of the lane was approximately one-hundred yards in
width, being bounded by the woods which covered Hill 785 and much of the
eastern slope of the ridge, while the field to the west of the lane
extended for several hundred yards down the western slope of the ridge..
Within thirty yards of the church were two out-buildings, one to the
west and one to the southeast, and across an open field one-hundred
yards to the north of the church was a house.
At 1115 hours Company "A"
launched an attack against this
strong point. The 2nd Platoon, twenty men in strength, led by 1st Lt.
Arthur H. V. Treo, made the assault, supported by two tanks of the 2nd
Platoon, Company "B", 757th Tank Battalion. While the tanks
fired into the church from a position just to the south of Montefredente
(779149), the Platoon moved through the woods on the eastern slope of
the ridge past the church, and then, leaving the edge of the woods,
attacked the church in assault waves from the northeast. While crossing
the open field, it received small-arms fire from the woods to its rear.
The Germans had been driven from the church by the tank fire, and as
soon as it was lifted, the Platoon rushed the church, taking possession
of it before it could be reoccupied by the enemy. The Platoon held the
church for four hours, exchanging small-arms fire with the enemy in the
pine woods twenty yards down the reverse slope of the hill. During this
period, the other rifle platoon of Company "A", which included
the men remaining in the 1st and 3rd Platoons, attempted to reinforce
the 2nd Platoon, but it became involved in a fire fight with enemy in
the woods on the eastern slope of the ridge and was unable to move. At
1500 hours, with no support in view and the danger of being cut off
increasing with approaching darkness and a dwindling ammunition supply,
Lt, Treo decided to withdraw his men from the church. The Platoon fell
back to Hill 785 without incident, having suffered only two casualties
in the entire action. When the Platoon had returned to its original
positions, the tanks resumed fire and before the end of the afternoon
had fired a total of one-hundred-and-five rounds into the church and
out-lying buildings. The Battalion consolidated its positions for the
night with Company "A" dug in on Hill 785, Company
"C" at point 726, and Company "B" in a reserve
position at point 664 (776155).
During the early afternoon
the 3rd Battalion built up a line across
the Sambro Valley from Hill 785 to point 615 (784160). Company
"K" tied in with Company "A" on the southeast slope
of Hill 785 (778161), while Company "L" organized a line which
tied in with Company "K" on the left and extended across the
road to point 615. While organizing this position, the Company received
long-range machine-gun and rifle fire from the vicinity of Hill 789.
Company "I", in reserve at Qualto, was fired on by machine
guns and mortars and by a self-propelled gun in S. Benedetto.
While the 3rd Battalion was
assuming these positions, the enemy was
holding on a line approximately two-thousand yards to the north, which
extended through S. Benedetto. A patrol from Company "I",
which returned to the company position in Qualto at 1130 hours, reported
having seen Germans in a dugout on Hill 647 (796170) and in the town of
S. Benedetto. Observation was good on 1 October, and the enemy holding
on this line provided a field day for the artillery. The Regimental
Intelligence and Reconnaissance Platoon, from an observation post on
Hill 1036 [(797148)], directed fire on a flak gun, a self-propelled gun,
and enemy personnel in S. Benedetto, and scattered enemy personnel who
were preparing a bridge at 783184 for demolition. Concentrations were
fired on what was believed to be a company of Germans digging in in the
vicinity of Campiano (788188).
[ 2 October 1944
]
At 0600 hours the 2nd
Battalion reported that elements of the 133rd
Infantry were passing through its front line positions. By 0930 the
Battalion was assembled in a draw at 806157, where it remained during
the hours of daylight, restricting itself to as little movement as
possible. Then, under the cover of darkness, the Battalion crossed over
the forward slopes of Poggio di Rosa and at 2345 hours closed into an
assembly area in the vicinity of Faldo (782138).
According to the plan of
attack for 1 October, the 2nd Battalion was
to pass through the 1st Battalion and continue the attack up the ridge
on the morning of 2 October, but at 1600 hours 1 October this plan was
changed. The Regimental Commander, Colonel H. C. Hine, Jr., instructed
Lt. Col. Golding at that time that the 1st Battalion would be relieved
only after it had taken and out-posted Hill 789. Accordingly Lt. Col.
Golding drew up a plan of attack for 0500 hours the following morning by
which Company "A", supported by one platoon from Company
"B", was to attack Hill 789, while Company "C"
attacked on the left with the mission of seizing the houses at point 688
(771167). In support of this attack, the 175th Field Artillery was to
fire one battery two rounds per minute on the village of Osteria dei
Ruggeri (775170) from 0500 to 0510 hours, and then was to shift one
battery two-hundred yards to the left.
At 0440 hours a composite
platoon of Company "B", which
included all the men remaining in the 2nd and 3rd Platoons, moved to
Hill 785 with orders to support Company "A"'s dawn attack.
Just at H-hour, when the two under-strength platoons of Company
"A" were ready to move forward, the Company's positions were
subjected to a heavy concentration of mortar fire which delayed the
attack. Company "C", which had already initiated its attack on
the left, reached Hill 697 without opposition. When the mortar fire had
been lifted from its positions, Company "A" attacked on each
side of the lane which led up to the church from the south. A hundred
yards from the church the Company came under heavy small-arms and mortar
fire which forced it to withdraw, after three men had been killed and
four wounded. It became evident in this attack that the enemy had
reinforced the position during the night, for he was defending from the
house to the north of the church and from the out-buildings to the west
and south of it, as well as from the church itself.
After Company "A"
had fallen back to its original positions
on Hill 785, a coordinated attack supported by tank fire was planned for
1000 hours, to be made by Company "A", with the composite
platoon of Company "B" attached, and by Company "C".
After the tanks had fired into the church, Company "B"'s
platoon was to attack through the woods on the eastern slope of the
ridge, while Companies "A" and "C" attacked across
the open fields on the western slope, with Company "C" on the
left.
In preparation for this
attack, Captain Normand E. Yando, Commander
of Company "A", led two tanks up the ridge from Montefredente
to positions on the forward slope of Hill 785, from which the could fire
point-blank into the church from a distance of two-hundred yards. After
the tanks had fired twenty rounds into the church, the troops moved
forward in the attack. Company "A" had hardly left its
positions on Hill 785 when it received small-arms and mortar fire. When
Captain Yando called for mortar fire on the enemy positions, the fire
fell short into the company and broke up the attack. A runner was then
dispatched from Company "A" to recall the platoon of Company
"B", which had not yet contacted the enemy in its advance
though the woods to the east of the church. Company "C", which
had initiated its attack from Hill 697, was out of contact with Company
"A" and continued the attack alone. The Company, in the
strength of two platoons, which were led by 1st Lt. Edward G. Smith,
Company Executive Officer, and 2nd Lt. Joseph W. Leary, advanced in a
line of skirmishers. When it came within two-hundred yards of the
church, a man on the hilltop took up a kneeling position and fired an
M-1 rifle. This caused some confusion in the Company, since it could not
be determined through the fog whether the man was German or American.
The Company continued its advance, nevertheless, and built up a firing
line thirty yards to the west of the church behind the stone facing of a
terrace. There the Company engaged in a fire fight with enemy in the
church and in the out-buildings to the south and west of it. From the
church steeple and through doors and windows the Germans fired on the
Company with several automatic weapons and threw a large number of
"potato mashers" down on it. Having decided that the church
could not be assaulted from the west, Lt. Leary, with his platoon
sergeant and runner, made a reconnaissance on the left flank to
determine whether the Company could shift to the north and attack the
church from the rear through the scrub pine. Before they had gone far,
they received machine-pistol fire from the woods and were forced to
withdraw. A short time later the men on the left flank of the Company,
believing themselves to have been over-run by the enemy, gave way. This
necessitated the withdrawal of the rest of the Company, which was
effected without casualties, a squad at a time.
With the enemy still
resisting stubbornly on Hill 789, Colonel Hines
planned in mid-morning to by-pass the enemy position by attacking with
three battalions abreast. At 1330 hours the 1st Battalion would make its
fourth attack on the church, while the 3rd Battalion attacked on the
right astride the road, and the 2nd Battalion attacked on the left on
the western slope of the ridge a thousand yards below the church. The
1st Battalion was to be pinched out just north of Hill 789. After
establishing itself on the ridge by the capture of Osteria dei Ruggeri
(772172), the 2nd Battalion was to pinch out the 3rd Battalion and
continue the attack up the ridge. For two hours prior to the attack the
artillery was to fire at the rate of twenty rounds per hour on
twenty-four targets which were for the most part possible mortar
positions, assembly areas, and routes of approach to Hill 789.
Time-on-target concentrations were to be fired on le Serucce (762178)
and Ripoli (762190).
Shortly after 1330 hours
Companies "B" and "C",
each having been reduced to the strength of two platoons, formed in the
vicinity of point 697 and attacked the church in a line of skirmishers,
with Company "C" on the left. Company "C"'s two
platoons were led into the attack by 2nd Lt. Joseph W. Leary, and
Company "B"'s by 1st Lt. Lawrence A. Gaffney and 1st Lt.
Edward S. Everett. After the two tanks on Hill 785 fired a preparation
on the church and its out-buildings, they lifted the fire of their 75mm
guns and opened fire with their .50 caliber machine guns. With this
supporting fire, and with the support of Company "B"'s section
of light machine guns, and all the small arms of Company "A",
the assault Companies advanced within thirty yards of the church and
built up a firing line just below the terrace, where Company
"C" had organized a line in the previous attack. In the fire
fight which followed, the Companies received heavy small-arms fire,
fragmentation and concussion grenades, and sniper fire from the rear and
left rear. Lt. Leary, making his second reconnaissance of the day to the
left flank to determine whether the enemy position could be flanked,
again drew machine-pistol fire. Lt. Gaffney, having determined that his
Company could not attack the church from the south, and being unaware of
Lt. Leary's reconnaissance, was himself going to make a reconnaissance
of the left flank when he was wounded by sniper fire from the rear.
Company "C" had had no bazooka in the previous attack, to fire
into the buildings, but now a man from Company "B" fired his
bazooka into the church until he was wounded, and then his assistant
continued to fire until all of the ammunition had been expended. Despite
the heavy fire which the Battalion could put on the church, the enemy
still held it and its out-buildings in strength. While the fire fight
continued, Lt. Leary and Lt. Everett conferred on the advisability of
assaulting the church, and since their ammunition was running so low
that it was doubtful whether they could hold the position once it had
been taken, they decided to withdraw. Moving a squad at a time, the two
Companies effected an orderly withdrawal.
When our heavy fire failed
to dislodge the enemy from Hill 789, some
credence was given to civilian reports that there was a crypt beneath
the church, a tunnel which extended from Hill 789 down the eastern slope
of the ridge to a reserve position at point 636, and extensive prepared
positions on the hilltop. An examination of the hill several days after
the enemy had withdrawn to the north showed that there was no tunnel in
the vicinity of the church and no crypt beneath it, though there was a
vestry room on the north side of the church which had been untouched by
our fire. The prepared positions on the hill consisted of a shallow slit
trench beside the out-building to the west of the church, a
hastily-prepared dug-out on the eastern slope, and a covered fox hole on
the reverse slope. Despite the meagerness of these positions, the fact
remained that six men of the Battalion had been killed and seventeen
wounded in four unsuccessful attacks on the hill. The strength of the
enemy defense lay not in field fortifications, but in the lack of
covered approaches to the position and in the out-buildings of the
church from which the enemy could put crossed fire on our troops from
whatever direction they attacked.. The enemy's use of these buildings in
his system of defense was the more successful in that the bulk of our
tank fire was directed into the church, as evidenced by the destruction
of the entire south wall, while the out-buildings remained relatively
intact. But whatever the distribution of fire, it required a determined
enemy to remain in these building under the 205 rounds of tank fire that
were directed into them on 1 and 2 October, and it is significant in
this regard that the 36th Regiment of the 16th S.S. Division was
identified as the unit opposing our 1st Battalion.
While the 1st Battalion was
making its fourth attack on the church,
the 3rd Battalion, still holding on a line between Hill 785 and point
615, established a strong out-post at point 636 (782167) on the Sambro
Valley road below Hill 789. Under the cover of fog the 1st Platoon of
Company "L" occupied the house at that point at approximately
1300 hours. As soon as the enemy detected the presence of the Platoon,
it opened fire with small arms from the houses at 182169 and 184170, and
began harassing the position with artillery fire. The Platoon called for
tank support, and within the hour two tanks pulled up the road and fired
into the houses to the north of the Platoon's position, silencing the
enemy small-arms fire, but heavy artillery fire continued to fall around
the house throughout the afternoon. The 2nd Platoon on Company
"K" joined the 1st Platoon of Company "L" at 1500
hours, and together the two Platoons defended the position during the
night. One man of Company "L"'s Platoon was killed and three
wounded in the day's action.
The 2nd Battalion's attack
was not initiated in time to exert
pressure on the enemy's left flank while the 1st Battalion was making
its fourth attack on Hill 789. Major Benjamin J. Butler had issued the
attack order to his Company Commanders at 1100 hours. Companies
"E" and "F" were to attack abreast with Company
"F" on the right, on the western slope of the ridge, passing a
thousand yards to the west of Hill 789. Company "G" was to
follow Company "F". When Hill 789 had been by-passed, the
assault companies were to swing to the right, Company "F"
attacking the village of Osteria dei Ruggeri on top of the ridge. When
this ground had been taken, Company "F" was to ride the ridge
to the north abreast of Company "E", which would attack
one-hundred yards down the western slope of the ridge. Hill 747 (771202)
was the Battalion objective. When the attack order had been given, it
was still necessary for the Company Commanders to make a reconnaissance
of the forward areas, and it was not until 1420 hours that both
Companies "E" and "F" cleared the Battalion assembly
area in the vicinity of Faldo. In the attack Company "E"
received scattered small-arms fire from the left, and Company
"F", while advancing along the trail from point 579 (768157)
to C. Banzole (768161), drew artillery fire but suffered no casualties
from it. At 1810 hours a platoon from Company "E" was at C.
Nuova (761165), with the balance of the Company at point 411 (762162),
and Company "F" was at C. Banzole, from which it dispatched a
platoon combat patrol to C. Piana di Ripoli (766166). This platoon drew
machine-gun fire from the house at 767168, but continued to advance to
its objective. Company "G", in the meantime, closed up to C.
Nuova (771153[?]). In these positions the Battalion spent the night.
[ 3 October 1944
]
At first light the 2nd
Battalion sent out patrols to the north
preparatory to resuming its advance. The enemy had not yet relinquished
Hill 789, as was discovered by a ten-man patrol from Company
"B", which at approximately 1030 hours was fired upon while
approaching the church. The 2nd Battalion initiated its attack in
mid-morning, and at 1340 hours Company "F" was in the village
of Osteria dei Ruggeri, patrolling to the north, while Company
"E" was at point 438 (762172). It was evident that by this
time the enemy had already withdrawn from the church, for Hill 789 had
been completely enveloped by the 3rd Battalion on the right and the 2nd
Battalion on the left, and an hour-and-a-half later a patrol from
Company "G" would find no enemy in the ruined church. During
the afternoon the Battalion advanced rapidly, reaching the 19 Northing
by dark. The advance had been so head-long that elements of the
Battalion had lost contact. Such was the case of two squads of the 1st
Platoon, Company "E", which were some distance to the rear,
while the third squad was in lead of the Company. After the Platoon
Leader, 2nd Lt. George D. Souers, had gone back to look for his two
missing squads, Captain Honshell K. Johnston, Company Commander, ordered
the lead squad to investigate the shrine on the crest of Hill 747, which
he fancied as a C.P. This squad approached the church from the southeast
and on the eastern slope of the hill surprised and captured two S.S.
troopers who were digging positions with no immediate concern for the
advance of hostile troops. After the squad had returned to the Company
position with its prisoners, the squad leader, Sergeant Elvin L.
Daughtry, went alone to the vicinity where the prisoners had been taken
and threw hand grenades at a suspected machine-gun position, which he
had observed on the crest of the hill. Having learned that Hill 747 was
occupied by the enemy, Company "E" took up position around the
houses at 770198, 768198, and 766198, approximately
three-hundred-and-fifty yards south of the church. Company "F"
organized its position around the houses at 772198, at Ca dei Sarti
(774198), and at 773200. An Italian civilian who remained in a house at
the first of these positions reported that there were four-hundred
Germans in the village of Monteacuto Vallese, which was just over the
hill, and that the enemy was occupying houses three-hundred yards to the
north, around which he had dug positions. Company "G" took up
a reserve position in the vicinity of point 729 (768193), with the
mission of protecting the left rear of the Battalion, with special
attention to the town of Ripoli, seven-hundred yards distant.
The 3rd Battalion attacked
abreast of the 2nd Battalion during the
morning and early afternoon. A reconnaissance patrol from Company
"I" reported at 1040 hours that the enemy had withdrawn from
S. Benedetto. The Battalion went into the attack, Companies
"K" and "L" advancing on each side of the valley
road, with Company "K" on the left, and Company "I"
attacking with the objectives of S. Benedetto and the village at 786178.
No resistance was encountered by the Battalion, and by 1330 hours
Company "I" had taken its objectives, and Company
"K" had entered S. Andrea (780178) and was occupying the high
ground to the southwest of the village (775175). The Battalion held on
this line during the night with the exception of the 1st Platoon of
Company "I", which late in the afternoon was assigned the
mission of out-posting the high ground to the north of S. Benedetto. As
the Platoon was approaching the houses at point 655 (792184),
machine-gun fire from a house at point 665 (791186) killed one man of
the Platoon and wounded a second. The Platoon closed rapidly into the
houses at point 655 and planned an assault on the enemy position. One
squad would provide a base of fire from the houses, while the other two
squads assaulted the position from the flanks. Additional supporting
fire would be provided by a .50 caliber machine gun mounted on a jeep
and two .30 caliber machine guns located in S. Benedetto. In the ten
minutes that the support elements fired, the assault squads attacked,
one along the road to the west of point 655 and the other through the
draw to the east of it. When the fire was lifted, they closed with the
position, driving the enemy out of the houses.
Having been pinched out by
the advance of the 2nd and 3rd Battalion,
the 1st Battalion assembled in Montefredente and Faldo, closing in at
1740 hours.
[ 4 October 1944
]
Early in the evening of 3
October the Regiment was instructed that
the 91st Reconnaissance Squadron would pass by the 2nd Battalion the
following morning. [
Note: the 91st Cavalry Reconnaissance Squadron
(Mechanized) was an independent 'battalion', attached by Fifth Army
where and as needed; it was not the 91st Reconnaissance Troop of the
91st Infantry Division.
] Though the 2nd Battalion had not yet gained
control of the lateral road to the Setta Valley, the commitment of the
91st Reconnaissance Squadron had become feasible with the securing of
the road junction at 781192. According to the attack order, elements of
the Squadron were to pass by the right of the 2nd Battalion at 0600
hours, at which time the platoon of tanks and the platoon of tank
destroyers attached to the 2nd Battalion would come under the control of
the 91st Reconnaissance Squadron. It was expected that if the 91st
Reconnaissance Squadron was successful, the entire Regiment could be
relieved on 4 October, but in any event the 1st and 3rd Battalions would
have a day of rest, the 1st Battalion at Montefredente and Faldo, and
the 3rd Battalion at S. Andrea and S. Benedetto.
Shortly after dawn of 4 October
a troop of the 91st Reconnaissance
Squadron set out to the north from the road junction at 781192, and a
platoon started up the road leading to Monteacuto Vallese. The troop
could proceed no further than the blown-out bridge at 781199. The
platoon had advanced to within a few hundred yards of Monteacuto when it
received small-arms fire from the slopes of Hill 747 and was forced to
withdraw. The squadron made no further advances during the day,and would
be unable to advance on the right until a by-pass could be prepared
around the blown-out bridge, and on the left while the enemy retained
control of Hill 747
After the patrol action of the
previous night, the enemy evidently
were as curious as we to know the strength and disposition of the force
opposite it, for at dawn on 4 October, just as Company "E" was
preparing to send a reconnaissance patrol to the church, an enemy patrol
of eight men approached the Company's position. Both Companies
"E" and "F took the patrol under fire, killing three of
the enemy and forcing the patrol to withdraw. For several hours
afterward Hill 747 was heavily shelled by our mortars and artillery.
Then, at 1130 hours, 2nd Lt. Souers, believing the enemy to have been
driven off the hill by this fire, took one squad of the 1st Platoon to
reconnoiter the hill. The enemy allowed this patrol to reach the top of
the hill, and then opened fire from both the left front and right front.
Having some defilade from this fire, the squad held its ground and
signalled two Germans in a dug-out nearby to come out and surrender, and
to a third German in a fighting hole, who seemed to be debating whether
or not to give himself up, but these overtures were unsuccessful. The
squad's position was particularly insecure in that it was lying in the
field of fire of a machine gun, the gunner of which was looking and
firing in another direction, and who fortunately never turned his head.
In this precarious position, having found the hill still to be held in
strength by the enemy, 2nd Lt. Souers ordered his [patrol] to withdraw.
With the enemy occupying the
house directly opposite from its
position, Company "F" had no freedom of movement in daylight
to form for an attack, but in a feigned attack in mid-morning the
Company drew heavy small-arms fire from the houses and from positions
around them.
The 2nd Battalion area was
harassed by mortars and artillery
intermittently throughout the day, and, between the hours of 1715 and
1930, the Battalion was subjected to an extremely heavy shelling from
mortars and from self-propelled, light, and heavy artillery. Two men of
the Battalion were killed and ten wounded in the day's action, most of
which casualties were inflicted by shell fire.
[ 5 October 1944
]
On 4 October, the Regiment was
instructed early in the evening that,
with the 91st Reconnaissance Squadron attached, it would attack the
following morning with the mission of seizing Objective Number
"3" in the Division attack plan, which lay five-thousand
meters to the north. Colonel Hine's plan of attack anticipated the
possibility that the enemy would withdraw during the night, since, if
visibility were good the next day, his position would be untenable with
the 133rd Infantry Regiment holding the dominating heights of Mt. Venere.
Therefore, Colonel Hine requested the artillery to harass possible
assembly areas and routes of withdrawal throughout the night, and,
against the possibility of pursuit, assigned to the 91st Reconnaissance
Squadron the sector astride the main highway. He directed the Squadron
Commander to send one platoon, with a platoon of tanks attached, against
the enemy in Monteacuto, in coordination with the attack of the 2nd
Battalion on Hill 747, and to initiate aggressive reconnaissance to the
north astride the valley road. In the event that the enemy did not
withdraw, the 1st and 3rd Battalions were to be prepared to attack on
half-hour's notice, the 1st Battalion at any time after 0700 hours, and
the 3rd Battalion after 1100 hours. The 2nd Battalion, after gaining its
objective, Hill 747, was to pass into Regimental reserve. In preparation
for the attack, the 1st Battalion moved after dark from its rest area in
Montefredente to an assembly area in the vicinity of Campiano (778190),
closing at 2115 hours.
But the enemy did not withdraw
during the night. At 0640 hours
Company "E" reported that the Germans were still holding Hill
747, and half an hour later word was received from the 91st
Reconnaissance Squadron that one of its platoons had contacted the enemy
one-thousand yards to the northeast of Hill 747 (778209). Colonel Hine
issued orders for the 2nd Battalion to press its attack against Hill 747
continuing its advance to the north, and for the 1st Battalion to attack
along the high ground to the right of and in coordination with the 91st
Reconnaissance Squadron.
Major Butler, commanding the 2nd
Battalion, studied the terrain to
find a way by which the enemy's defenses might be outflanked. The
Germans were still holding the houses in front of Company "F"
in strength and, from several prepared positions on the gradual eastern
slope of the hill, had grazing fire down the hillside to the southeast
and south and across the forward slope of the hill. The approaches to
the flat, cultivated ground on top of the hill were covered by this
flanking fire, as well as rifle and machine-gun fire from two
camouflaged positions which had been dug on the hillside itself, fifty
yards south of the shrine. The western slope of the hill fell off
sharply, defilading an attacking force from fire from the right, but
offered no suitable route of approach to the hilltop. Major Butler
decided to by-pass Hill 747 to the west , and in the early afternoon he
assigned that mission to Captain Raymond C. Stillger, Commander of
Company "G". It was planned that the Company would take the
western nose of the hill, where it would build up a base of fire to
support its attack on Monteacuto Vallese.
In the meantime, Companies
"E" and "F" continued
to exert pressure on the right. Company "F" registered mortar
and artillery fire in on the houses three-hundred yards to its front
with good results, while Company "E" directed fire on a heavy
machine gun, which had been duelling with Company "H"'s
machine guns, and on other enemy positions on the eastern slope of the
hill. After a 60mm mortar concentration had fallen around his hole, one
German raised a white flag and ran into Company "E"'s
positions. He reported that all but one or two of his comrades had fled
from the hill under our heavy mortar and artillery fire, but a few
minutes later a man of the Company exposed himself and drew heavy
machine-gun fire. At noon the 2nd Platoon of Company "E"
passed through the 1st Platoon in an attack on the shrine. The enemy
allowed the men to advance within a few yards of the flat top of the
hill and then lobbed hand grenades down on them, forcing them to
withdraw.
Company "G" attacked
at 1600 hours. Before the Company
could reach the defilade of the steep eastern slope, it received
plunging machine-gun fire from the top of the hill and grazing fire from
the houses on the western nose of the hill. Unable to advance against
this fire, the Company organized a line from point 711 (771199) to the
house at 768197.
The platoon of tanks attached to
the 2nd Battalion attempted to
support the Battalion with direct fire into Monteacuto in the late
afternoon. The tanks approached within a few hundred yards of the town,
where they received small-arms and mortar fire from the slopes of Hill
747. Unable to fire into the town because they were masked by a cut in
the hillside, and since the visibility was closing down, the tanks
withdrew to the vicinity of the bridge at 778194, where they spent the
night.
Despite the occupation of Mt.
Venere by the 133rd Infantry Regiment,
the enemy continued to defend the valley road as well as the northwest
slopes of Mt. Venere. The two platoons of the 91st Reconnaissance
Squadron which attacked initially over the trails to the west of the
valley road were engaged in a fire fight early in the morning.
Continuing to maneuver on these trails during the day, they received
occasional anti-tank fire, but in the late afternoon, succeeded in
working a patrol across the Sambro River to C. Bonfiglioli, which was
fired upon with mortars and small arms and forced to withdraw behind
Hill 442.
Upon learning that the enemy had
not withdrawn from in front of the
2nd Battalion and the 91st Reconnaissance Battalion during the night,
Colonel Hine ordered the 1st Battalion to attack, according to plan,
over the western slopes of Mt. Galletto, a maneuver intended to
out-flank the enemy force which was blocking the Regiment's advance
through the valley below. At 0830 hours, Lt. Col. Golding met with his
staff and Company Commanders in the command post in Campiano and gave
them the attack order. At 1000 hours, when Company "C" had
already left for Molinelli (799201) and the forward command group was
just clearing the Battalion area, forty-nine shells fell in the vicinity
of the Battalion C.P., killing five men and wounding eighteen. The
operation of the Battalion was disrupted for several hours by the loss
of key personnel in this shelling, and the attack was delayed. Company
"A" had suffered the heaviest casualties. A shell which had
fallen through the roof of the Company C.P. had killed Captain Normand
E. Yando, Company Commander, 1st Lt. John A. Bittner, Platoon Leader,
Sergeant Charles C. Lee, acting Platoon Leader, and Staff Sergeant
Aloysius A. Schulte, acting First Sergeant, and had wounded 1st Lt.
Henry L. Harris, Executive Officer. In addition, eight enlisted men of
the Company were wounded outside of the C.P. Company "A"'s
loss of three officers brought to a climax the Battalion's already
critical shortage of officer personnel and necessitated an extensive
reorganization before the Battalion could resume the attack. Two
officers from Cannon Company, 1st Lt. Lewis H. Bloom and 2nd Lt. Sidney
O. Mathis, and 1st Lt. Albert S. Jacobson of Anti-Tank Company, were
transferred to Company "A", along with 2nd Lt. Edward S.
Everett of Company "B", who took command of the Company. A
second officer from Anti-Tank Company, 1st Lt. Robert C. Bowen, was
transferred to Company "C". From Company "D" 2nd Lt.
John C. Kucwicz and 2nd Lt. Morton E. Haim were transferred to Companies
"B" and "C" respectively. With the addition of these
officers from Anti-Tank and Cannon Companies and from Company
"D", the total officer strength of the three Rifle Companies
was increased to ten. At 1330 hours, when the reorganization of the
Battalion was well in hand, and Captain Justin J. Foley, Assistant
Regimental S-3, had replaced 1st Lt. John C. Grier, who had been
wounded, as Battalion Operations Officer, the forward C.P. group left
Campiano, followed an hour-and-a-half later by Company "A" in
reserve, which by that time had completed its reorganization. The
Battalion was then advancing in the order Company "C", Company
"B", and Company "A".
Since by noon, the 1st Battalion
was still undergoing reorganization,
and the Regiment had now received orders to reach the 24 Northing before
dawn of the following morning, Colonel Hine directed the 3rd Battalion
to slip past the right of the 1st Battalion, taking advantage of
security offered on the right by the 133rd Infantry and of such blocking
action on the left as, in the meantime, would have been achieved by the
1st Battalion. It was anticipated that the 3rd Battalion, meeting
lighter resistance in its sector, would overtake and pass the 1st
Battalion. By 1420 hours the 3rd Battalion had cleared S. Benedetto and
was advancing toward Molinelli in the order Company "I",
Company "L", and Company "K", By 1625 hours the
leading elements of the Battalion had arrived abreast of the right
elements of the 1st Battalion. Since there was only one trail on the
western slope of the mountain in this part of the sector, Colonel Hine
ordered the 1st Battalion to allow the 3rd Battalion to pass, and the
3rd Battalion to continue its attack to the north, with Hill 661
(792239) as its objective for the night. Company "I", having
no contact with the enemy, made rapid advance in spite of heavy fog, and
at 2400 hours occupied Hill 661. Company "L" stopped for the
remainder of the night at la Mandria (793238) and out-posted the western
nose of Hill 661 with one platoon. Company "K" and the
Battalion command group stopped in the vicinity of Gabbiano (794224).
Before it had been cleared by the tail of the 3rd Battalion, the 1st
Battalion was ordered to stop for the night, and out-post its positions
strongly, prepared to resume the attack in the morning. The Battalion
was then disposed as follows: one platoon of Company "C" at
790215, with the balance of the Company at 791204, Company "B"
at 795211, and Company "A" at 791204.
[ 6 October 1944 ]
Colonel Hine then directed the
1st and 3rd Battalions to continue
their attack at dawn and to seize and out-post the forward slope
overlooking the Setta River between the 25 and 26 Northings, from which
they could control the Setta Valley road. The 1st Battalion, on the
left, was ordered to guard the road and bridges against possible enemy
attempts at demolition. Both the 1st and 3rd Battalions were ordered to
establish OPs and direct artillery fire on targets of opportunity. The
2nd Battalion was to continue its attack up the ridge on the left of the
Regimental sector, patrolling as far as the village of Rioveggio
(766248).
When the 2nd Battalion received
the order to attack, a four-man
patrol from Company "G" had already found the houses on the
western nose of Hill 747 to be free of the enemy, and the 1st Platoon of
Company "E" had reported that only one German remained in the
shrine on Hill 747. At 0830 hours Major Butler issued the attack order.
The Battalion was to attack in the order Company "G", Company
"F", and Company "E", first taking the town of
Monteacuto Vallese, and then continuing the attack over the ridge to the
north. Captain Stillger, Commander of Company "G", went into
Monteacuto with a four-man patrol and found it to have been evacuated by
the enemy. By 1000 hours the balance of the Company had entered the town
along with the tanks and elements of the 91st Reconnaissance Squadron.
Under cover of fog, the tanks then took the lead, but a thousand yards
north of Monteacuto they bogged down. Elements on the 91st
Reconnaissance Squadron then led the advance, two jeeps driving into the
village of Belvedere (770225), and a patrol continuing on foot to
Montorio (771229). At 1330 hours Major Butler was ordered to consolidate
his troops in Montorio, and to send a patrol to contact the 1st
Battalion, but since Company "G" had already reached la Torre
(769236), and Company "F" was following Company "G",
he organized his defensive position further to the north. Company
"G" remained at la Torre and established an out-post on the
knob of the hill at 767238. Company "F" occupied the houses la
Ca (770231) and la Casetta (770232) and at point 366 (766234), and
Company "E" moved into Montorio and C. Marzolara (766229). The
Battalion remained in this position for four days with the mission of
protecting the left flank of the Regiment.
At first light the 1st and 3rd
Battalions resumed their advance. By
1315 hours both Company "I" and Company "L" were on
the objective. At the end of the afternoon, the 3rd Battalion had
organized a line with Company "I" at 788257 and 793255 with an
out-post at Cosse (791264), Company "L" at 781254 and 784255,
and Company "K" and the Battalion C.P. at la Mandria (793238).
The 1st Battalion had established its position with Company
"B" at Rioveggio (767248), Company "C" at Polverara
(775250), and Company "A" and the Battalion C.P. at Brigola
(781237). The Regiment's advance during the day had been made under the
cover of fog, which had been a material advantage since the northern end
of the Sambro Valley and the ridge overlooking it on the west were under
observation by enemy in position on the high ground across the Setta
River. This advance probably would not have been possible on a clear
day, as was evidenced by the enemy's heavy shelling of Rioveggio with
self-propelled artillery when he noticed Company "B"'s
movement into the village.
In his withdrawal from the
Sambro Valley the enemy made such
extensive use of demolitions that the valley road could not be opened
until 8 October, forcing the 1st and 3rd Battalions to maintain their
lines of supply and communication on the trail over the western slopes
of Mt. Galletto and Mt. Venere. Since the 1st and 3rd Battalions both
used this trail, the problems of the 1st Battalion can be considered to
be typical. On October 5 and 6 ten miles of WR 110 wire were laid by
hand from the 1st Battalion rear C.P., initially in Campiano, to the
Battalion forward C.P. at Brigola. The spools of WR 110 wire were packed
by mule, and because of a delay in obtaining sufficient mules, the
Battalion forward C.P. did not have wire communication with the
Regimental C.P until 0100 hours 7 October. The problem of supply was
equally difficult. On the nights of October 6 and 7 rations and
ammunition were carried to the Companies both on mules and in peeps, but
the trail was so narrow that two peeps and several trailers were lost
over the embankment. At 1600 hours, 6 October when a radio message was
received at the Battalion rear C.P. at 788183 that the forward C.P. had
been established at Brigola, the rear command group set out to join the
forward. Ammunition, rations, and wire were loaded on mules, while the
peeps traveled empty. When the mule train reached Brigola, rations and
ammunition were transferred to peeps, in which they were carried to the
Companies on the line. When the valley road was opened by the engineers
on 8 October, there was no further necessity for using the difficult
trail over the mountainside. The Regimental Communications Section
established a forward switch at Molinelli (778232), which greatly
decreased the Battalion's difficulties in maintaining its wire lines.
With the road open, rations could be carried to the Battalion C.P. at
Brigola by 1-1/2 ton trucks and from there to the Companies by peep. The
Battalion was fed hot meals throughout the last phase of this
operation.
[ 7-9 October 1944 ]
During the three days October
7-9, in which the Regiment occupied a
defensive position over-looking the Setta River, our troops were
comparatively inactive. The 2nd Battalion, which was protecting the left
flank of the Regiment, rested in houses on the ridge and completed the
issue of its winter equipment. Because of enemy observation from high
ground across the river, the Battalion Commander ordered that movement
outside of the houses in daylight be kept to a minimum. Company
"C" was engaged in a fire fight in mid-morning of 7 October,
when an estimated number of ten Germans, who evidently were withdrawing
without a knowledge of our positions, walked past the Company C.P. A man
in the C.P. observed four of this group of enemy and fired on them with
a pistol. Immediately the Germans scattered and took cover. Small arms,
heavy machine guns, and mortars were fired on them, but in mid-afternoon
they made their withdrawal across the Setta River with only two of their
number wounded. On the night of 7-8 October, a patrol from the 3rd
Battalion found the bridge at 793268 to be intact and no mines in the
stream bed for one hundred yards on each side of it.
While the activity on our lines
was negligible during the three-day
period when the Regiment was in the defensive position, the enemy
provided numerous targets of opportunity for the artillery. The Germans
were preparing defenses on the high ground beyond the Setta River, and
at first they moved freely on the forward slopes during daylight.
Several groups of Italian civilians and Germans digging positions on the
forward slopes were fired on. At 1015 hours 7 October, Major Butler
fired artillery, with excellent effect, on thirty Germans who marched
past the railroad station at 751227 [Stazione di Grizzana], two-thousand
yards from the Battalion O.P. in Montorio. In the early afternoon of 7
October, 1st Lt. Kenneth L Bailey, Intelligence and Reconnaissance
Platoon Leader, observed from the Regimental O.P. in Montorio a German
in his O.P. in [Molinello] di sotto (750237). The two observers duelled
with artillery until they landed volleys close to each other's O.P., and
then the duel ceased.
xxx The Regiment continued in
position protecting the left flank of
the Division until the night of 9-10 October, when its relief by the
91st Reconnaissance Squadron, which had been in progress since the night
of 7-8 October, was completed. With the exception of the 81mm Mortar
Platoon and the Intelligence Section, the 1st Battalion was completely
relieved by 0300 hours 8 October. After spending the night in assembly
areas a few thousand yards behind the front lines, the Battalion closed
into Montefredente and Borgo at 1955 hours. The 3rd Battalion was
relieved by 1730 hours and closed in S. Benedetto at 2210 hours, with
the exception of Company "I" which went on to Qualto. The 2nd
Battalion withdrew from its positions on the ridge after dark on 9
October and moved to the village of Faldo.
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