USS Abner Read (DD526)
Action Report for August 18, 1943

According to information contained in the book United States Destroyer Operations in World War II, it describes the Aleutian campaign of 1943 and states the following about the USS Abner Read (DD-526):

The Japanese evacuation of Kiska, accomplished by means of submarines in June [1943] and surface forces in July, must remain one of the more remarkable exploits of World War II. Where undersea blockade running had proved over costly, Japanese surface forces, operating under cover of night and fog, had succeeded in getting in and out of through the blockade undetected. This in spite of watchful American patrols and search radar!

It might be added that in all probability such a fade away by the enemy could only have happened in the weird Aleutians. And, after all, there was a sufficiency of danger in the island's investment—enough, perhaps, to satisfy hindsight critics who did not risk their lives in the operation. The price that the occupation forces might have paid had the enemy resisted is suggested by the token payment made by the destroyer Abner Read. The Japs collected this gratuitous toll on August 18 [1943], long after their abandonment of Kiska.

Early in the morning of the 18th, Abner Read was steaming along on A/S [anti-submarine] patrol off Kiska's dark coast. At 0150 [1:50 a.m.] the destroyer was executing a turn when a stupendous explosion jolted the ship with a gigantic leverage that drove her bows [front of the ship] deep in the tide. A deafening blast. A fountain of flame and water. With that fiery thunderclap the destroyer's fantail [rear of the ship] heaved, and she fell back with a tremendous shudder, disabled. A floating mine had blown up her stern.

Flung from their bunks, men who had been sleeping in the aftermost compartment found themselves struggling in a jagged jungle of interior wreckage. Belowdecks was in utter darkness. Caught in a trap of buckled bulkheads [walls] and twisted steel, injured men cried out and the unconscious lay in grotesque postures. Groping through the pitch dark, the men made their way to ladders [stairs] and hatches [doorways]; their knowledge of the ship's layout and compartments [rooms on a ship] served them well. Water rose steadily in the dark compartments, and asphyxiating fumes began to surge through the passageways [hallways on a ship]. In orderly fashion—the calmness in which old hands meet emergency —the men made their way topside. But the thickening fumes tried every man's nerves.

. . .

On the ship's bridge, the Commander Thomas Burrowes, sent out a distress call. The disabled destroyer, powerless and listing [tilting to one side], was caught by the muscular tide that was carrying her toward the rocks of a Kiska beach.

Plates, decks, and framework ruptured and broke as the ship's stern [rear] section settled. Many survivors on the ship's fantail found the deck almost too hot to stand on barefooted. Worse was the smudge that enveloped the stern. Choking officers reported to the bridge that the fumes were becoming unbearable. Men staggered blindly through this suffocating vapor, stumbling, gagging, with hands to throat.

Veterans shouted to tell the rookies that the fog was not enemy gas, but chemical smoke—the destroyers smoke generators were damaged and the FS tanks were fuming. FS liquid, a compound of sulfur trioxide and chlorsulphonic acid, combines immediately and violently with water or moisture in the air. If consistently inhaled, the fumes can prove toxic and painful. Spraying from the Abner Read's damaged smoke generators, these fumes enveloped the ship with a toxic vapor that was almost as anguishing as phosgene [poisonous gas]. Commander Burrowes described the ordeal in his report:

The FS smoke was the most depressing single defect of the disaster that the men had to cope with. It blinded them, but worse yet it strangled them. It appeared to immobilize their respiratory muscles, so that they could neither breathe in or out. After a few whiffs of smoke, their mental outlook became one of forlorn abandon. They lay down and waited for the ship to sink. Some leaned fruitlessly over the lifelines desperately gasping for air. About four climbed up on top on No. 5 gun mount, where they caught not over one or two whiffs of fresh air before the stern sank. Sinking of the stern brought great relief to all men on it by way of escape from FS smoke. Water was cold and covered with fuel, but was such a minor consideration compared to the terrifying effects of the smoke.

Fortunately the fantail did not sink with a plunge. The stern section broke away gradually and went down slowly, and a number of survivors had a chance to grab for a floater net [a type of lifesaving device] that drifted clear of the wreckage. The water was thickly carpeted with oil, but that was preferable to the FS fumes.

With her stern under the sea, Abner Read drifted closer to the snarling rocks. Her distress had become dire emergency when the destroyer Bancroft (Lieutenant Commander R.M. Pits) came to the rescue. Shortly before 0300 [3:00 a.m.], Bancroft took the disabled Abner Read in tow and jockeyed her away from the Kiska reef.

. . .

Around 4:00 a.m., the Bancroft was relieved by the salvage tug Ute and by daylight of the 18th, the Abner Read was on her way to Adak for preliminary repairs. According to Commander Burrowes, "the actions of the Bancroft and Ute kept us off the beach"

The Abner Read was the only warship casualty in the Kiska operation.

The Action report of the USS Abner Read (DD-526), serial number 006, from the Commander of Task Group 16.3 to the Commander in chief, US Pacific Fleet, dated August 26, 1943.

On December 11, 1963, the US Navy de-classified the action report of August 18, 1943 which detailed the resulting severe damage to the stern section of the USS Abner Read. The report concluded that the ship contacted a floating mine while on anti-submarine patrol off Kiska [Island, Alaska] August 17-18, 1943. I have a copy of this report and will summarize below the lengthy report for the reader.

This report was submitted to the commander in chief of the US Pacific Fleet from the commander of Task Group 16.3, F.W. Rockwell and is dated August 26, 1943; it was originally classified as "SECRET".

The report is quite detailed and offers suggestions to make the Fletcher class ships less vulnerable to such blasts in the particular area of which the Abner Read was severely damaged. In essence, the description of the actual damage to the ship is described thus:

The ship struck a floating mine and the explosion on the left rear side of the ship, and the settling of the ship's stern in this area, between the twin 40mm gunmount and the number four gun turret, caused the stern to break away and sink. The damage caused the left propeller shaft [the ship had 2 propeller shafts] to break off around the area of the explosion. The further dropping of the stern due to the taking on of water, caused the bending of the right side propeller shaft. The propeller nut, which holds the propeller to the propeller shaft, appears to have split apart and the lack of support allowed the broken stern to separate from the remainder of the ship and sink.

On August 15 and 16, 1943, the USS Abner Read was assigned to fire support missions in relation to the US landings on Kiska to re-take the island from the Japanese forces. Upon landing and fanning out on the beach head, the troops found that the Japanese had abandoned the island prior to their arrival. The Abner Read was re-assigned to anti-submarine patrol off Kiska, near Blue Jay Rock off Conquer Point, Sparrow Rocks, and an area off Bluff Cove, labeled on US Navy charts "POSSIBLE MINE FIELDS". The ship's course [called "K-7" on the USN charts] was about 6400 yards in length and about 2000 yards from the points described above. The ship's course of K-7, ran in a diagonal compass direction of 320 degrees to 140 degrees.

On August 17, 1943, sunset was at 9:32 p.m; evening twilight ended at 10:46 p.m.; and moonrise was at 10:51 p.m. After dark navigation was, by necessity, entirely by radar. The commander of the Abner Read was greatly concerned about the safety of the ship. However, it was definitely proven by previous destroyers who had patrolled the same course on earlier days, that accurate fixes or navigational mileposts could be determined from radar echoes on Blue Jay Rock and Sparrow Rocks. Explicit instructions were written in the ship's Night Order Book to ensure the safety of the ship.

The ship's speed was reduced to five knots [between 5 and 6 miles per hour] to permit more accurate fixes to be taken between the ends of the shoreline. The average depth of the sea floor was about 50 fathoms or about 300 feet. The sea was calm and there was a wind from the south at 2 miles per hour; the moon could be seen at intervals through a broken sky and there was intermittent fog and mists. In essence, it was a quiet, calm, beautiful night.

The chronological events of the early morning hours of August 18, 1943 as described in the report are detailed below in their entirety to give the reader the most accurate rendition of the events of this moment. All times in this chronological listing are in "military" or 24 hour time: 0000 is midnight; 0100 is 1:00 a.m.; 2000 is 8:00 p.m.; and so forth.

This portion of the action report was generated by the commanding officer of the USS Abner Read (DD-526),

The following paragraphs are reproduced exactly as they were written in 1943 from the action report:

20 August 1943

Drydocked in floating drydock, YFD-22.

C. THE EXPLOSION AND IT'S IMMEDIATE EFFECT.

I. General Facts established from interviewing survivors.

 

1. A violent explosion took place which apparently did not awake up all men sleeping. Some state that they were first aroused by the strong gas (FS smoke) entering the compartment and making it difficult for them to breathe.

    

2. Accounts vary, but the large majority indicate that there was no confusion or crowding at ladders and hatches in escaping from compartments. It appears that the exodus was reasonably quiet and orderly.

    

3. Except in one or two isolated cases, there were no lights in the compartments after the explosion. All was in utter darkness. Men had to grope and feel their way from bunks to hatches. Their knowledge of the layout of compartments served them well.

    

4. Most of the bunks in the aftermost compartment (C-205L) came down from the shock of explosion, impeding men in their efforts to escape. Many mattresses spilled out into the narrow passageways and thereby hindered men in rapid transit. Numerous bunks in C-203L and C-204LM came down from the shock of explosion, but by no means all—probably less than half.

    

5. Almost immediately after the explosion, FS smoke commenced entering the living spaces.

    

6. The FS smoke was the most depressing single effect of the disaster that the men had to cope with. It blinded them, but worse yet it strangled them. It appeared to immobilize their respiratory muscles, so that they could neither breath in or out. After a few whiffs of smoke, their mental outlook became one of forlorn abandon. They lay down and waited for the ship to sink. Some leaned fruitlessly over the lifelines desperately gasping for air. About four climbed up on top of #5 gun mount, where they caught not over one or two whiffs of fresh air before the stern sank. Sinking of the stern brought get relief to all men on it by way of escape from FS smoke. Water was cold and covered with fuel, but such was a minor consideration compared to the terrifying effects of smoke.

    

7. The FS smoke completely covered the stern from about frame 168 aft. There was no escape from it.

    

8. One or more FS smoke tanks was dislodged from it's stand, ruptured, and blown forward on the port main deck to about frame 170. Gas was issuing from this tank and covering the entire fantail. Other tanks were probably similarly dislodged and issuing gas.

    

9. Shortly after the explosion, water began entering the compartments in moderate quantities. A number of men, on leaving their bunks, found water ankle-deep on the deck. They heard no violent noises as though the ship were about to break up. Many remarked afterwards about how comparatively quiet and orderly all seemed at the time, although all were aware that something untoward and unusual was occurring.

    

10. In a short time, plates, decks, and strength members began to fail and rupture rapidly in the vicinity of frame 170 (after a considerable number of men had escaped to the main deck). Some witnesses state that a few men, groping in the darkness apparently fell through large holes in the deck into fuel oil tanks below.

     

11. As the main deck gave way slowly at frame 170, men in the compartment below could discern the night sky above. A few escaped by crawling up through the breaks in the deck, either to safety on the forward part of the ship, or to the sinking stern section.

     

12. Many survivors on the fantail found the deck intensely hot—almost too hot to stand on with bare feet.

     

13. As the parted stern section gradually sank, men on that section of the ship were dragged down to a considerable depths by it. Upon returning to the surface, they were able to get their first breath of good fresh air in several minutes, which was greatly appreciated, however cold the water or thick the fuel oil. Men in the water were no longer bothered by FS smoke.

     

14. One of the floater nets carried on the stern floated out of its cradle as the stern went down. Many men, upon coming to the surface, found this floater net immediately or closely at hand, and swam to it. Some probably owe their existence to its presence.

     

15. The stern broke off gradually after the explosion as slowly sank, after end first. Most men on the fantail believed at this time that the entire ship was sinking stern first.

II. Engineering Department (in full split-plant operation).

[This section consists of witnesses accounts of the explosion and it's after effects as experienced by men in the engineering spaces, i.e., the engine rooms, fire rooms, and electrical rooms. This section will not be reproduced here. Consult the full report for this section.]

III. Gunnery Department.

 

1. Due to FS Smoke, the men on the after 40mm and #4 - #5 gun were directed to leave their stations and go forward.

    

2. All remaining depth charges were checked and found to be on Safe". Impulse charges were removed from the throwers.

    

3. In the I.C. room, grounds were noted on #5 - 5 inch gun and all circuits including battle telephones to this gun were secured. The fuze had blown on the 2PA (gun firing circuit). With the master gyro stopped due to failure or its suspension, the own ship's course" input to the computer was secured.

    

4. Made all preparations to flood remaining magazines if required.

IV. Radio and Radar.

0205     Unable to use TBK to report damage due to failure of ceramic antenna insulators. Other material operable.

D. RESCUE AND CARE OF THE WOUNDED.

I. Rescue Boat.

 

1. Within a few minutes after the explosion, #2 motor whaleboat, manned by volunteers, proceeded towards the oily wake trailing from the ship's port quarter. After picking up one man 50 yards from the ship, the boat continued to the vicinity of a floater net to which several men were seen clinging. Several survivors were rescued enroute. Upon determining that the men on the net were safe for the time being, the search was continued to the end of the oil slick, a distance of almost 200 yards. Several men were rescued in this area. With no additional survivors in sight although the area was clearly illuminated by the moon, the boat loaded to capacity and with the net in tow, came alongside the ship. In all, 20 men were thus rescued. Great difficulty was experienced in taking the oil covered men aboard. Two boats from other ships were meanwhile searching the area which was plainly marked by an oily surface. No additional survivors could be found.

II. Report of Medical Department.

 

1. On hearing the explosion, the Medical Officer proceeded to his battle station in the Wardroom. Casualties were brought to the wardroom until it was filled, following which they were placed in the Captain's cabin and the Division Commander's cabin. Upon arrival most of the casualties were covered with fuel oil and most of those who had been exposed to FS smoke escaping from the ruptured smoke screen generators were coughing up moderate amounts of whitish sputum. As each casualty arrived the nature of his injuries was quickly evaluated and those who were suffering from smoke inhalation only were carried below to the C.P.O. quarters or officers quarters. Here, if it had not already been done, wet clothing was removed and the patients placed in bunks and covered with blankets.

    

2. The more serious cases and those with lacerated wounds were retained in the wardroom. All lacerated wounds were cleansed with soap and water, sprinkled with sulfanilamide and first aid dressings applied. Two cases were in shock, one being an extensive burn, the other being a suspected abdominal injury. The burn case was given morphine 1/4 grain and 2 units of plasma intravenously. Both responded satisfactorily. The deceased patient was brought in about 30 minutes after the explosion and although apparently dead was given artificial respiration. Total time of administering artificial respiration was about one hour. At the end of this time it was seen that treatment was of no avail, and artificial respiration was discontinued and the body removed to the torpedo deck. One of the patients who had been exposed to FS smoke required artificial respiration on two occasions. At about 0700 all casualties received by mouth 4 grams of sulfadiazine prophylactically followed by 1 gram every 4 hours until transferred to U.S. Naval Dispensary, N.O.B. ADAK, ALASKA. By 0800 all casualties were out of shock and in bunks, and those who were able to take food received coffee and toast. At this time each casualty was reexamined and classified according to injuries. Sixteen patients with lacerated wounds and burns were brought one by one to the sick bay where definitive treatment was given. All lacerated wounds were thoroughly cleansed with saline, sprinkled with sulfanilamide powder and sterile dressings applied. All burns were cleansed with soap and water, and dressed with heavy dressings of boric acid ointment gauze.

    

3. While its treatment was being given in the sick bay the chief pharmacist's mate supervised the cleaning up and redistribution of smoke exposure gases. These cases had been previously separated, the Medical Officer indicating those in good enough condition to take showers. As the smoke exposure cases were taking showers and the cases with wounds or burns were being cared for, bunks in the officers' quarters and crews quarters were prepared so that each patient when treated could return to a clean bunk. By 2130 all casualties had been examined and treated. All permitted had received food and all were comfortable. At 0700, 19 August, each patient was reexamined and notes completed for the health records. 19 .5cc Tetanus toxic booster shots were administered to all requiring them. Each patient was classified as to whether he should be transferred ambulatory, transferred by stretcher, or retained on board, and a complete casualty list was drawn up. The total number of casualties was 48. One dead and 34 casualties were transferred to U.S. Naval Dispensary, N.O.B. ADAK, ALASKA. (24 stretcher cases and 10 ambulatory). Eight were retained on board.

    

4. On 20 August 1943 a survey of the crew revealed five more slight casualties who were transferred to the hospital.

E. ANALYSIS.

 

1. ABNER READ was engaged in regularly assigned war operation.

    

2. Line K-7 had been patrolled by various destroyers since 15 August and by ABNER READ since about 1300, 17 August 1943.

    

3. Extreme caution was required at night and in poor visibility to keep the ship in a safe navigational position.

    

4. Condition of Readiness Two (half the battery, watch in 3); Material Condition Baker; and complete split-plant operation were in effect and set.

    

5. The crew off watch were not concentrated by ratings.

    

6. The explosion was on the port quarter as evidenced by the 4 degree initial list to port, the fact that the port propeller tail shaft was destroyed and disappeared, and that the port engine stopped immediately.

    

7. The damage was not from the dropping of own depth charges as evidenced by:

    

   1. All depth charges had been set and checked on "safe" after dark. All depth charges remaining after the explosion were on "safe". There were no explosions when the stern sank. Twenty men were rescued from the water after the stern sank.

       

   2. Had a depth charge rolled off the stern accidentally (although weather was calm and pins were in levers), while the ship was swinging right with full (32 degrees) rudder and with speed reduced to about 3 knots due to the drag of the rudder, even on the extreme shallow setting of 50', it would explode 25 yards horizontal distance on the starboard quarter. With the normal "medium" setting on 200', the sinking time would have permitted the stern to move a horizontal distance of about 48 yards and the explosion would be on the starboard quarter. In each case, the slant range to the center of the explosion would of course be greater.

       

   3. The damage caused by a depth charge at 25-48 yards would be of the "near-miss" type, and would result in distortion and leaks to the adjacent hull and fittings. This is confirmed by Plate 9, O.P. 747, which gives for a 600 lb. depth charge:
      Zone II (Some damage to surface vessel) - 70 to 45 feet.
      Zone I (Serious damage to surface vessel) - 45 to 10 feet.
      
      Note that these distances are in "feet" and are to the center of the explosion and not horizontal distance.

    

8. The damage was not from own depth charges exploding on the deck as evidenced by:

    

   1. The initial damage was not on the top-side.

       

   2. The depth charges were seen (but naturally not counted) in the racks by a witness who was carried down by the stern.

       

   3. It is a practical physical impossibility for a depth charge to explode until the extender has been operated hydrostatically and then only after the pistol cover has been wiped.

    

9. The explosion was of the destructive contact type which actually heated the decks above. This fact in itself eliminates the feasibility of the damage being done by one of our own depth charges.

    

10. The possibility of an enemy submarine torpedo is eliminated because:

     

    1. The torpedo would have come from an area so restricted as to preclude the presence of a submarine.

        

    2. No propeller noises were heard on the sound gear.

        

    3. No torpedo wakes were seen.

        

    4. From the personal experience of the Commanding Officer, the destructive effect would have been much greater.

        

    5. The ship, stopped and helpless, would have been an easy target for a follow-up shot which never came.

     

11. An area marked "POSSIBLE MINE FIELDS" was located about 3000 yards inshore from the point of explosion. It is not unreasonable to assume that one of these anchored mines may have broken loose or that a floating mine may have drifted across the ship's track.

F. Opinion.

It is the opinion of the Commanding Officer that:

(1)    The stern, swinging to port, made contact with and exploded a drifting enemy mine.

(2)    The underwater structure was destroyed abaft frame 170.

(3)    The above-water structure was blown upwards; within about four minutes it broke clear by its own weight at frame 170 and sank, leaving the ship watertight forward of bulkhead 157.

(4)     The loss of life resulted from the choking and blinding effects of the concentration of FS smoke (from the ruptured smoke generator tanks), and from the men being trapped in the stern section when it sank.

(5)    The absence of fire in the midst of the shattered fuel oil tanks and magazines is considered providential.

G. Remarks.

 

1. A complete report of damage will be forwarded in accordance with current directives.

    

2. The conduct of all officers and men was exemplary. Recommendations for awards and commendations will be made the subject of separate correspondence. Particular credit is due the Commanding Officers USS BANCROFT and UTE whose promptness and efficiency in taking ABNER READ in tow was directly responsible for keeping her off the beach towards which she was helplessly drifting, and in permitting her to reach the nearest base.

[signed]

T. Burrowes

The deck log of the Abner Read beginning at midnight August 17, 1943 are unremarkable. The only event logged on the 17th was during the 0800-1200 watch when Lt. William Dyer, Jr., recorded "As before. [Meaning nothing significant occurred during the watch, other than routine duties] 0800 mustered crew on stations. No absentees. Made daily inspection of magazines and smokeless powder samples, conditions normal."

On the deck log dated Wednesday, August 18, 1943 during the 0000-0400 watch, curiously, Lt. (jg) CR Proctor noted "No remarks. [But the ship had struck a floating mine at 0150.] 0300 Deane Layton Warren, 265-59-69, RM2c, U.S.N. declared dead (killed in action) as results of drowning, by Lieut. J. Rogers (MC) [Medical Corps] U.S.N. Time of death set at 0152 this date."

The deck log entry for the watch 0400-0800 made by Lt. (jg) WT Doyel, states: "As before. [Meaning 'No Remarks' as stated during the previous watch. But then the officer of the deck begins listing the seventy wounded men alphabetically by name, service number, rank and nature of injury.]

The deck log entry for the watch 0800-1200 made by Lt. L. Hoffman states: "As before. 0800 held quarters for muster. Following men listed missing in action. . ." and the list of the 70 men lost are listed alphabetically by name, service umber and rank. At the end of the entry, it notes "Made daily inspection of magazines and smokeless powder samples. Conditions normal."